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Abstract
Water scarcity is a global concern that necessitates a global perspective, but it is also the product of
multiple regional issues that require regional solutions. Water markets constitute a regionally
applicable non-structural measure to counter water scarcity that has received the attention of
academics and policy-makers, but there is no global view on their applicability. We present the global
distribution of potential nations and states where water markets could be instituted in a legal sense, by
investigating 296 water laws internationally, with special reference to a minimum set of key rules:
legalization of water reallocation, the separation of water rights and landownership, and the
modification of the cancellation rule for non-use. We also suggest two additional globally distributed
prerequisites and policy implications: the predictability of the available water before irrigation periods
and public control of groundwater pumping throughout its jurisdiction.
1. Introduction
Water scarcity is one of the most high-impact global
risks (Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2016, World Eco-
nomic Forum 2016). Supply enhancement, such
as the construction of dams and desalination plants,
was the main approach used to counter water scarcity
throughout the 20th century (FAO 2012, Gleick
2003). This approach produced enormous benefits,
but also had environmental costs associated with facil-
ity development. Consequently, increasing attention
has focused on measures that complement the tra-
ditional approach, promoting the efficient use of a
fixed amount of water rather than seeking new supplies
(Gleick 2002, 2003). For example, the state of Cali-
fornia, in the United States, which is famous for its
elaborate system of dams and aqueducts, has launched
various non-structural projects in recent decades, par-
ticularly in the face of a historic drought (Hogue and
Pincetl 2015). One such measure is water realloca-
tion, which enables users to satisfy their water needs
by transferring water among sectors without building
additional facilities (Grafton et al 2012).
Water reallocation is the change in water alloca-
tion between agricultural, industrial, domestic, and
environmental sectors, or within sectors (e.g. among
farmers). Theoretically, this canbemanagedby apublic
organization or a market mechanism. Water reallo-
cation implemented by a market mechanism is often
called a water market or water trade, which is the focus
of this paper. This paper examines domestic-level water
markets to determinehownationalwater laws affect the
formation of water markets.
A water market is a representative ‘soft path’ mea-
sure (Gleick 2003) that can provide adequate incentives
for users to use water resources efficiently (Zekri and
Easter 2007, Hernandez-Mora and Del Moral 2015).
The case of California shows that the strength of
water demand usually differs among water sectors,
even under water shortage conditions (e.g. Califor-
nia Department of Water Resources 1992). As long
as such differences exist, water markets have an impor-
tant role in decreasing economic loss by reallocating
the diminishing water supply to water users in accor-
dance with the strength of their demand for water
(Kennedy 1992, Howitt 1994). Individual measures
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have limited effects on water scarcity; however, there
is growing interest in water markets as an option
for addressing water scarcity (Debaere et al 2014,
Hernandez-Mora and Del Moral 2015).
Recently, attempts have been made to determine
how the combination of reservoirs, desalination plants,
and improvements in irrigationefficiency (e.g. drip irri-
gation) could reducewater scarcity in various regions of
the world (Wada et al 2014), extending several global-
scale water scarcity assessments (Oki and Kanae 2006,
Haddeland et al 2014, Jimenez Cisneros et al 2014). By
contrast, little attention has been paid to water mar-
kets in the context of water scarcity assessments. This
is partly due to the fact that the success of water reallo-
cation depends largely on social institutions (e.g. legal
conditions) and the collaboration of natural and social
science is necessary to estimate potential application
areas.
The purpose of this paper is to present the first
global distributionof potential nations and stateswhere
water markets could be instituted in a legal sense, by
investigating 296 water laws internationally. We also
suggest two additional globally distributed prerequi-
sites: the predictability of the available water before
irrigation periods and public control of groundwater
pumping over its entire jurisdiction.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Investigation of global water laws
Previous studies showed that the implementation of
a water market requires several legal conditions, as
discussed in detail below. Hirshleifer et al (1969)
demonstrated howwater laws could promote or hinder
the creation of a watermarket, with special reference to
riparian and appropriative rights in the United States.
More recently, their analytical perspective was followed
by studies that have suggested the importance of three
legal conditions: the existence of a rule allowing water
reallocation (Grafton et al 2012); the separation of
water rights and landownership (Chong and Sund-
ing 2006, Grafton et al 2012); and modification of
the cancellation rule for non-use (Bowden et al 1982,
Gray 1989, Reisner and Bates 1990, Littleworth and
Garner 2007). We substantiated that these three legal
conditions are a minimum set of key rules through
the cross-country analyses using California, Chile, and
the Murray–Darling Basin in Australia as case studies.
Then, we examined where these legal conditions are in
a global context.
To investigate water law globally, we used Water-
Lex, a database on water laws compiled by the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), to
identify locations that could support the implementa-
tion of water markets in a legal sense. Note that this
analysis was based on the 2015 version of WaterLex.
WaterLex has two weaknesses. First, it covered only
78 countries and regions. Second, although it offered
general information on water laws, it did not explain
how the articles in a water law influence water policy.
We circumvented these weaknesses by expanding the
research objective, and analyzing how the three legal
conditions were met among countries and regions.
In this exhaustive inquiry, national and state water
laws were scrutinized, because some federal countries
delegate the authority to enact water law to state gov-
ernments. We checked the state water laws of four
federal countries (Australia, Canada, India, and the
United States). As a result, we examined 296 cases.
Since we focused on formal water law, informal, cus-
tomary water laws were not considered, even though
they may have important roles in water management
(see supplementary materials for details available at
stacks.iop.org/ERL/13/034032/mmedia).
2.2. Computation of area with low runoff during
irrigation periods
In addition to legal conditions, natural or environ-
mental conditions may affect the application of water
markets. California, Chile, and the Murray–Darling
Basin in Australia are all characterized as Mediter-
ranean climate regions; they have dry and wet seasons,
and natural river flow peaks occur in winter or spring
(Bonada and Resh 2013). Farmers irrigate land in sum-
mer when there is little precipitation. This climate
enables predictions of the available water before the
irrigation period, and makes it easier to prepare for
a water market before the irrigation period begins.
For example, in the face of the 1991 drought in Cal-
ifornia, The Drought Action Team created by the
Governor’s executive order on February 1 forecasted
that water supply from the State Water Project and
Central Valley Project (the two largest water delivery
infrastructures in the State) would be severely curtailed
in the upcoming season. On February 15, they recom-
mended the establishment of water reallocation (i.e.
the Drought Water Bank). The team requested urgent
action, because potential sellers (farmers) were mak-
ing cropping decisions and potential buyers (cities)
were suffering from limited water supply. Immediately
following this recommendation, theCaliforniaDepart-
ment of Water Resources began contacting potential
buyers and sellers to realize the water market (State of
California 1991, Coppock et al 1994). This enabled
farmers to make informed decisions on whether to
leave land fallow, and to sell water, before the irri-
gation period. If the irrigation period and wet seasons
overlapped, it would be difficult to promote sufficient
water trades among water users.
Agricultural water accounts for 70% of global
freshwater withdrawals (FAO 2012) and 92% of global
freshwater consumption (Hoekstra and Mekonnen
2012). Meanwhile, domestic and industrial water have
relatively low seasonal variations. Thus, the seasonal
variation in agricultural water greatly affects total
water consumption, including domestic and industrial
water. To discuss the necessary conditions to support
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water markets, we examined climatic conditions,
specifically, the global distribution of areas with low
runoff during the irrigation period (see supplementary
material for the methods).
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Legal conditions for water markets
Generally, a market cannot work without an under-
pinning legal framework (North 1991). We showed
that three legal conditions are critical to fostering
water markets via cross-country analyses, using Cal-
ifornia, Chile, and the Murray–Darling Basin as case
studies (see the supplementary material for data on
water trades in these areas). Three conditions are
categorized as ‘introduction’ or ‘promotion’ factors.
The introduction factor is the legal condition under
which the government has a rule for water realloca-
tion. Although indispensable for the introduction of a
watermarket system, it is insufficient alone. Promoting
a water market requires two additional legal condi-
tions: the separation of water rights and landownership
and relaxed cancellation for non-use. Details of three
conditions are described below.
First, there must be a water rights system, in which
water reallocation is legalized. The existence of a water
rights system is a necessary condition of any watermar-
ket, because there is no commodity to trade if water
rights do not exist. However, this condition alone is not
sufficient. Water rights are not always tradable, partly
due to legal constraints or the lack of a rule on trad-
ing. Thus, water reallocation must be clearly allowed
by the government. If a government does not legalize
water reallocation, it is impossible to implement awater
market.
In California, a water market has played an impor-
tant role during severe droughts, including the recent
historic drought, since it was legislated under a state
water policy in 1980 (Littleworth and Garner 2007,
Cooley et al 2015). In Chile, the water law was changed
in 1981 (the 1981 Water Code), after the revolution.
Water rights were deemed to be private property rights,
and amarketmechanismwas introduced forwater allo-
cation (Bauer 2004). In the case of theMurray–Darling
Basin, a water market was first allowed in the states
of South Australia and New South Wales in 1983, fol-
lowedbyQueensland andVictoria (Grafton andHorne
2014).
Second, water rights and landownership must be
separated to enable water trades (Chong and Sunding
2006, Grafton et al 2012). If they are linked, there is
an obstacle to promoting water markets, because indi-
viduals cannot buy and sell water as an independent
resource and water use is confined to riparian land,
which makes it impossible to satisfy water demands
in non-riparian areas. Generally speaking, states in the
eastern United States have ‘riparian rights’, which link
water with riparian land, allowing landowners access to
adjacent water sources. Conversely, the western states
have ‘appropriative rights’, which allocate water on the
principle of ‘first-in-time, first-in-right’, regardless of
whether a water user possesses the riparian land. Cal-
ifornia and Washington are exceptions to the western
United States, which admit both riparian and appro-
priative rights within their jurisdictions.
Appropriative rights are separated from landown-
ership in the western United States (Littleworth and
Garner 2007), although some states such as Nevada
and Oklahoma partly restrict transfer for uses sep-
arate from the land (Getches et al 2015). In the
case of the Murray–Darling Basin, the Council of
Australian Governments separated all statutory water
rights from landownership in 1994 to promote water
markets (Grafton and Horne 2014). Water rights in
Chile were separated from landownership in the 1981
Water Code (Bauer 2004).
Finally, a forfeiture rule affects creation of a water
market. It means that water rights are lost if the water
is not used for a certain period (Chong and Sunding
2006). This rule is sometimes called the ‘use-it-or-lose-
it’ principle. Strict application of this rule would hinder
a water market indirectly. Few individuals will econo-
mize water use when conservation activity is regarded
as non-use and the conservedwater is subject to cancel-
lation. As a result, noone has an incentive to conserve
water, which could otherwise create surplus water for
trade (Reisner and Bates 1990). Whether a govern-
ment legalizes the sales of such conserved water is
also important. However, modification of the forfei-
ture rule is more fundamental, simply because there
will be less water for trade in the first place under the
‘use-it-or-lose-it’ principle. Shorter periods of cancel-
lation for non-use support stronger incentives to keep
usingwater as before. In that case, regardless ofwhether
sales of conserved water are allowed, even temporal,
short-term transfer will not be realized.
California coped with this problem from the late
1970s to the early 1980s. The state legislature modified
the ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ principle to extend the cancella-
tion moratorium from three years to five years. Then,
it declared that conserved water would not be lost,
and that such water was tradable (Bowden et al 1982,
Gray 1989, Littleworth and Garner 2007). During the
drought of 1991, one of the largest water market expe-
riences in California history, the state government
repeatedly announced that surplus water created by
water conservation would not be cancelled, to pro-
mote a water market (California Department of Water
Resources 1992).
Extending the cancellation moratorium period is
a double-edged sword. While it promotes the efficient
use of water resources through a water market, it may
cause other inefficiencies by creating dormant water
rights. For example, the Chilean government did not
prohibit non-use (Bitran et al 2014). This enabled par-
ties to acquiremorewater rights than they actually used.
Inonecase, apower-generating companymonopolized
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Figure 1.Global distribution of the three legal factors necessary to support water markets. The details leading to each classification are
shown in figure 2. The green areas are the countries or regions most suitable for a water market in a legal sense.
the water rights to an entire river. The government
decided to impose an escalating fee against non-use in
2005 to avoid such inefficient water allocation. Accord-
ing to this policy, a party that does not exercise its water
rights is required to pay a non-use fee (Borzutzky and
Madden 2013, Bauer 2013). In summary, the period of
cancellation for non-use should be neither too long nor
too short.
3.2. Areas wherewatermarkets are potentially appli-
cable
Figure 1 shows which countries and regions meet the
legal conditions for a water market. This map is based
on an investigation of the water laws in 296 cases. The
colors yellow, yellow-green, and green correspond to
an increasing degree of satisfaction. Figure 2 shows
how we classified the areas in this order in figure 1 (see
supplementary material for details).
Fifty-eight cases satisfied all three legal conditions,
and are colored green in figure 1 (see supplementary
table). In addition to the western United States, the
Murray–Darling Basin, and Chile, several Asian coun-
tries (e.g. Indonesia, Vietnam,Korea and some states in
India), SouthAfrica,Russia andvariousother countries
satisfied all three legal conditions. These are potential
areas where water markets can be implemented in a
legal sense.
There were 66 countries and regions that did not
satisfy all of the legal conditions. These could bedivided
into two groups. The first group is the yellow-green
jurisdictions that satisfied two legal conditions (the
introduction and one of the two promotion factors)
(e.g. Brazil and Philippines). The second group is the
yellow regions that satisfied one legal condition (the
introduction factor only) (e.g. Mexico). The 55 coun-
tries in white did not even satisfy the introduction
factor: 30 had no rules for water reallocation (e.g.
Hungary and Romania), and 25 prohibited water real-
location (e.g. Kazakhstan). The countries in grey lacked
sufficient information for analysis.
Considering a few examples, South Africa satis-
fies three legal conditions, and water markets have
been developed there (Nieuwoudt andArmitage 2004).
However, its neighborsNamibia andZambiameet only
two legal conditions. To implement a water market,
they need to loosen the moratorium period of can-
cellation for non-use (the current moratorium period
in both countries is three years), so that water users
can create surplus water for trade through conser-
vation. Figure 1 shows the same problem will occur
in other dry countries such as Iran and the Kyrgyz
Republic. The hurdle of law amendment is higher in
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland,
and Zimbabwe, where only the introduction factor was
satisfied. It is necessary to separate water rights and
landownership and to relax the moratorium period
for cancellation for nonuse. This difficulty can also be
applied to Mexico and Morocco. While these results
come from an analysis of national water laws, we also
considered statewater law. For example, although India
iswidely known for its informal andcustomary ground-
water market (Manjunatha et al 2011), various formal
laws exist at the state level. The water laws in some
states in India, where water is relatively scarce, satisfy
the three legal conditions.
Besides these conditions, the applicability of water
markets may depend on other legal factors, such as the
legal definition of groundwater. For example, it may
be difficult to establish water markets where ground-
water is treated as an open-access resource. Figure 3
shows regions where groundwater is defined as an
attachment of the overlying land, and is not subject
4
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Figure 2. Flow chart to determine the applicability of water markets.
Figure 3. Global distribution of groundwater pumping regulations. Red areas have no permission system for groundwater pumping
throughout the entire jurisdiction. In those areas, modification of groundwater pumping rules is required to promote a water market.
to pumping permission in its entire jurisdiction. They
include Honduras, Japan, Mexico, and most states in
India. In such cases, where there is no cap or limitation
on groundwater pumping, water users may increase
groundwater pumping, instead of buying water from
other water users to cope with water shortage. Promot-
ing a water market in such areas requires modification
of the groundwater pumping rules.
Not only legal conditions but also natural or envi-
ronmental conditions may affect the application of
water markets. California, Chile, and the Murray–
Darling Basin are all characterized by low precipitation
during their irrigation periods, and irrigation is the pri-
mary use of water. This climatic condition enables the
prediction of the available water before an irrigation
period, and makes it easier to prepare for a water mar-
ket before the irrigationperiodbegins.Thisprerequisite
for water markets, the predictability of available water
before an irrigation period, is at least partially satisfied
in the shaded areas in figure 4. Here, low river runoff
5
Environ. Res. Lett. 13 (2018) 034032
Figure 4. Global distribution of areas with low runoff during irrigation periods (i.e. where the cumulative daily runoff during an
irrigation period is< 20%of the annual runoff). Thismap shows potential areas with predictable water availability before the irrigation
period.
was used instead of low precipitation, because water
resources can be supplied from upstream, and runoff is
more suitable for assessing water availability (e.g. Oki
and Kanae 2006, Wada et al 2014).
According to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC
AR5), a decline in future water availability under global
warming is projected inMediterranean regions and the
regions of SouthernAfricanmentioned above (Jimenez
Cisneros et al 2014). Mediterranean regions are also
an area in which this climatic prerequisite is generally
satisfied because of its dry summers and wet winters
(figure 4).Given this climatic prerequisite, awatermar-
ket may be a possible countermeasure to intensifying
water scarcity under a warming climate, but the cancel-
lation periods for non-use are short (e.g. three years
for Italy and one year for Portugal). As mentioned
above, such a cancellation policy should be relaxed to
promote water markets in these countries (figure 1).
Some regions have twomajor annual crop periods.
In these areas, the climatic prerequisite can be evalu-
ated separately for each of the irrigation periods. For
example, a water market might be considered difficult
to implement inwarm, humidAsian regions during the
first crop season, because the rainy season and irriga-
tion period coincide and water users are likely to hope
for sufficient rainfall during the rainy-irrigation sea-
son; however, as indicated in figure 4, a water market
may be possible during the second crop season dur-
ing which water users can expect little rainfall. While
we discussed the suitability of areas where water avail-
ability can be predicted before the irrigation period
for water markets, we did not discuss seasonal climate
forecasting. Seasonal climate forecasting may provide
data to support water markets in additional regions
beyond those discussed here.
In addition to this climatic prerequisite, a region
may require sufficient reservoirs to store water before
the irrigation period, which is believed to be the case
for the three case study regions. The three case study
regions have highly varying river flows due to their
dry and wet seasons (Bonada and Resh 2013). More-
over, annual variations in stream flow are high in these
regions (Dettinger et al2000).Under suchvariable con-
ditions, it is important to secure a stable supply of water
during the irrigation period (dry season) to establish a
water market. Reservoirs can somewhat stabilize river
flow (e.g. Lytle and Poff 2004), since they can store
water during the wet season and supply water during
the dry season. Farmers and decision-makers can pre-
dict the available water based on the amount of water
in reservoirs before the irrigation period and prepare
for water trades.
Finally, it is necessary to mention a few limita-
tions of this paper. Although we only discussed legal
conditions, future research studies should consider
other social-science factors such as water pricing that
reflects the cost of transportation (Bakker 2005), water
use accounting, an immediate identification system
between buyers and sellers (Garrick et al 2013), water
rights registration systems, and the enforcement of
water rights (Wheeler et al 2017). Where these fac-
tors are not satisfied, a water market will not work well
due to high transaction costs. Clarifying the global dis-
tribution of those conditions is a future research topic.
Research examining factors other than legal require-
ments would also explain why successful watermarkets
are rare.
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Note that a water market is not a panacea. For
example, the original Chilean model of a water market
introduced with the 1981 water code was regarded
as a leading example of a free-market approach to
water allocation (Bitran et al 2014). It promoted the
reallocation of water resources to high-value uses in
some watersheds, but it failed to consider ground-
water and environmental flow (Bauer 2013). Such a
watermarket would have enormous third-party effects.
This problem is likely to arise, especially in regions
where there is no permission system for groundwater
pumping (see figure 3). In such areas, groundwa-
ter easily becomes an alternative source of tradable
water. Although groundwater trading may be an effec-
tive short-term solution to water shortages in such
a region, this could result in groundwater depletion.
It could also decrease the flow of adjacent rivers,
causing ecological damage and water shortages in the
downstream area. Water markets promote the efficient
use of water, as long as such third-party impacts are
considered fully.
Even if a water market could be evaluated pos-
itively from the perspective of efficiency criteria,
it might not be able to satisfy equality criteria.
The water market in California in 1991 reduced
economic activities in water-selling regions and had
negative effects on farm employment because some of
the water for sale was created by fallowing (California
Department of Water Resources 1993). Bauer (2013)
also asserts that, generally speaking, the water market
exacerbated the inequality of income distribution in
Chile. This suggests that policymakers should consider
both efficiency and equality when they consider the
introduction of a water market. How to balance effi-
ciency and equality in water resource management is
an issue that remains to be investigated.
4. Concluding remarks
Water markets are receiving attention as a ‘soft path’
measure for coping with water scarcity. However, there
is no global perspective on the applicability of water
markets. In this paper, focusing on three legal con-
ditions as minimum requirements to support water
markets, we created a global map of the potential appli-
cability of water markets. This first global map was
accomplished through the collaboration of a social
scientist and environmental scientists.
Future research should consider other social con-
ditions such as water pricing, water use accounting,
and water rights registration systems (Bakker 2005,
Garrick et al 2013, Wheeler et al 2017). In addition, a
watermarketneeds tobeevaluatedusingbothefficiency
and equality criteria before implementation. Despite
the remaining issues discussed above, this study pro-
vides a foundation for emerging research toward the
sustainable management of water resources across the
globe.
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